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bstract
This paper explores whether business group affiliations affect the covariance structure of stock returns in Korea. We find that the stock returns
f firms belonging to the same business group show positive and significant comovement. The strong comovement between group returns and
rm returns is explained by correlated fundamentals. We find strong comovement among business group affiliate earnings. Moreover, variance
ecomposition of returns shows that cash flow news plays a relatively more important role in explaining group comovement than discount rate news,
uggesting a link between stock return comovement and the “tunneling” and “propping” behaviors of business groups. Finally, return comovement
ncreases when a firm joins a business group. 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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.  Introduction
Large, diversified business groups are a prominent feature of
he economic landscape in many countries, particularly in Asia.
 business group is a consortium of firms that are connected,
ften through common share ownership of member firms. It is
ommon for a single individual or family to control all member
rms, and cross holdings among member firms are also typical.
he role of business groups has attracted considerable aca-
emic attention, with researchers presenting evidence in favor
f both value-creating and value-destructive functions of busi-
ess groups. However, relatively little attention has been paid to
orrelations among member firm stock returns.
In this study, we explore whether business group affiliations
mpact the covariance structure of stock returns for business
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nnual meeting for their valuable suggestions.
∗ Corresponding author at: Pacific Lutheran University, 12180 Park Avenue
outh, Tacoma, WA 98447, United States. Tel.: +1 917 676 6316.
E-mail address: mooneytk@plu.edu (T. Mooney).
Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
c
m
(
m
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2015.09.001
879-9337/© 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Aroups in South Korea. Focusing only on Korean business groups
known as chaebol) provides two advantages. First, chaebol
rms are clearly defined. The Korea Fair Trade Commission
KFTC) publishes business group membership each year, iden-
ifying member firms and ranking groups by total assets. Second,
ocusing on Korean markets helps to control for differences
n country-level institutional environments that may introduce
ndogeneity issues and confound results (Joh, 2003).
Using stock returns and business group composition data
or Korean firms during the period 2002–2011, we find that
tock returns for firms within the same business group exhibit
ignificant comovement, beyond market-wide movements. Fur-
hermore, when we control for industry-wide movement, the
ffect of group affiliation on chaebol firm comovement remains
ositive and significant. Our findings are consistent with related
tudies which suggest that corporate governance mechanisms
ermitting concentrated ownership over member firms is asso-
iated with increased stock return comovement (Morck et al.,
000; Jin and Myers, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009).
We next examine the sources of the business group return
omovement. Vijh (1994) shows evidence that return comove-
ent could arise from fundamental (economic) or sentimental
noneconomic) factors. It is likely that stock return comove-
ent within Korean business groups stems from the correlation
ll rights reserved.
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f the affiliates’ fundamentals. Firms within Korean business
roups are connected by mutual cross holding agreements.
hese cross holding arrangements might be an underlying factor
ffecting return comovement, because even though a control-
ing shareholder does not have an incentive to manipulate the
erformance of affiliates, the fundamentals of affiliates may be
ffected through equity cross holdings (Bae et al., 2008). Thus,
f strong return comovement of business group affiliates is sig-
ificantly influenced by these activities, then the fundamentals
f affiliates would also exhibit strong comovement. To test the
ink between return comovement and fundamentals, we mea-
ure comovement in group members’ earnings. We find strong
ositive comovement in business group firm earnings, consis-
ent with the fundamental explanation of business group return
omovement.
We further explore the sources of chaebol stock return
omovement by evaluating the relative importance of two fun-
amental components of stock returns, cash flow news and
iscount rate news (Campbell, 1991). Stock returns change due
o innovations in expected future cash flows-which measures real
ctivity-and innovations in the discount rate applied to those
ash flows, which measures financial activity. Therefore, we
ecompose unexpected stock returns into expected cash flow
nd discount rate news by utilizing the return decomposition
ramework in Vuolteenaho (2002). We find that stock return
omovement is, on average, more strongly related to cash flow
ews comovement than discount rate news comovement, sug-
esting that real activity is more important than financial activity
n explaining chaebol stock return comovement.
To validate our evidence that the comovement of stock
eturns of affiliates is attributable to the chaebol group affili-
tion effect, we examine a subsample of affiliates that changed
heir group affiliation during the sample period. Our investiga-
ion is motivated by recent studies that have explored the “index
nclusion effect” on the comovement of stock returns. For exam-
le, Barberis et al. (2005) find that corporations newly added to
he S&P 500 index experience a significant increase in stock
eturn comovement with the rest of the index. Empirical analy-
is of firms that are newly added to (or removed from) a Korean
usiness group would provide a more rigorous setting for verify-
ng robustness of the group affiliation effect on the comovement
f stock returns. We find that stock returns of firms that newly
oin a Korean business group comove positively with the returns
f the group they join. Prior to joining the chaebol, these firms
xhibit an insignificant degree of comovement with returns of
hat group.
Our study is related to Kim et al. (2015), who focus on
omovement before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The
uthors find that business group comovement increased follow-
ng the crisis, which they attribute to being in investors’ preferred
habitat” along the lines of Barberis et al. (2005). In addition,
im et al. find that comovement is not related to simple fun-
amental measures such as ROA, cash flow, and related party
ransactions. We extend Kim et al.’s results by decomposing
usiness group comovement into cash flow news and discount
ate news. Our results contrast with those of Kim et al. in that
e find substantial evidence that business group comovement is
b
i
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elated to fundamental factors, as evidenced by group earnings
omovement as well as our evidence from the decomposition of
roup returns.
Our results contribute to the literature on return comovement
n three areas. First, our results provide new insight into the rela-
ionship between business group affiliations and the covariance
tructure of stock returns. Second, we show evidence that stock
eturn comovement among chaebol firms is driven by comove-
ent in fundamental factors of member firms. Finally, our study
akes an important distinction between cash flow news and dis-
ount rate news, and provides compelling evidence that cash flow
ews is more relevant than discount rate news in the comovement
f stock returns among chaebol members.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
riefly reviews relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data
mployed in our study. Section 4 documents the group comove-
ent of stock returns for firms that are affiliated with Korean
usiness groups. In Section 5 we explain the decomposition
ramework of stock returns, and we test whether group returns
omovement is more strongly associated with cash flow or dis-
ount rate news comovement. Section 6 examines changes in
usiness group affiliation, and Section 7 concludes.
.  Literature  review
Existing literature has examined the value implications of
usiness groups. One collection of studies suggests that business
roups have the potential to perform a value creating function
mong member firms. For example, in countries where exter-
al capital markets are not well developed and have severe
nformation asymmetry, business groups can facilitate more effi-
ient allocation of internal capital or sharing of resources and
isks. Khanna (2000) reviews the literature on business groups in
merging markets and reports that they can enhance social wel-
are in countries that lack certain institutions. Khanna argues
hat business groups may partially replace contract and prop-
rty rights enforcement mechanisms that are more established
n developed countries. Khanna and Palepu (2000) study busi-
ess groups in India and find similar results, that business groups
an help overcome imperfect markets.
Other studies find evidence that business groups may exploit
he weaker institutions of the countries in which they operate,
aking advantage of minority shareholders. This stream focuses
n the agency problems that arise from the separation of cash
ow and control rights, a defining feature of many business
roups. This discrepancy in cash flow and control rights can
reate incentives for the controlling shareholder of the group to
xpropriate wealth from member firms, which researchers have
ermed “tunneling.” Johnson et al. (2000) review the legal treat-
ent of tunneling and find that it is prevalent in both developed
nd emerging countries. Furthermore, the authors find that it is
ften conducted legally, despite being in conflict with minority
hareholder interests. Examples of such legal tunneling cited
y Johnson et al. include the sale of assets from a firm to
ts controlling owner at below-market prices, loan guarantees
ollateralized by the firm’s assets, and excessive executive com-
ensation. Bertrand et al. (2002) find evidence of tunneling in
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ndian business groups. Their methodology is based on how
rms respond to performance shocks. In contrast, Siegel and
houdhury (2012) question several aspects of Bertrand et al.’s
ethodology. Most notably, they argue that differences in firm
usiness strategy must be considered, or else firm responses to
ndustry shocks may be misinterpreted as tunneling. The dispar-
ty in the conclusions of these two studies suggests that the role
f business groups as vehicles for tunneling has not yet been
esolved.
A few studies have looked specifically at chaebol firms in
orea for evidence of tunneling. Bae et al. (2002) study chae-
ol firms and find that when a chaebol firm acquires another
rm, the chaebol firm’s stock price tends to fall. However, other
rms that belong to the chaebol tend to have positive abnormal
eturns around the acquisition. Given that the controlling owner
f the chaebol has an ownership interest in all member firms, the
wner benefits overall from the acquisition, consistent with the
unneling hypothesis. Almeida et al. (2011) find similar results
or chaebol firms, and posit that the shares of such firms trade
t a discount because they are sometimes used as a vehicle for
alue-destroying acquisitions. Tunneling is not the only nega-
ive side effect of business group affiliation. Kim and Yi (2006)
nd that greater separation of ownership and control at chaebol
rms is associated with more severe earnings management.
Firms that belong to business groups may also benefit from
he financial resources of other member firms. It is conceivable
hat firms facing potential financial distress may receive finan-
ial backing from other member firms; this “reverse tunneling”
s referred to as propping by existing literature. Studies in this
egment contend that a controlling shareholder of a business
roup may help member firms experiencing financial difficulty
y providing private funds or internal capital, so as to reduce
he default risk of the firm and ensure group survival. Bae et al.
2008) examine earnings announcements of chaebol firms and
nd that a negative earnings announcement by a firm has a neg-
tive effect on the market value of all firms that belong to the
haebol, consistent with investor pricing of propping within a
haebol. Friedman et al. (2003) find that controlling sharehol-
ers prop up member firms as a means to future expropriation
f wealth from those firms.
Researchers have identified comovement among stock
eturns, citing various factors that contribute to return comove-
ent. Kim et al. (2015) study return comovement among Korean
usiness groups. Their analysis is based on average pairwise cor-
elations among member firms vs. industry firms. The authors
nd that business group stock returns commove more than
ndustry-level stock returns, and that comovement increased
fter the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Kim et al. argue that group
omovement cannot be explained by fundamental factors, which
hey measure using firm return on assets (ROA), cash flow, and
elated party transactions. As described in Section 5.2 below, we
nd that business group comovement is significantly related to
rm fundamentals.Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find comovement among firms
hose corporate headquarters are in the same geographic loca-
ion. Interestingly, they find that when a firm moves the location
f its headquarters, the firm’s returns comove with returns of
a
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rms in the new location after the move. This event study context
s an appealing way to demonstrate robustness, and we employ
t below. Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) present evidence that
ountry level factors explain return comovement much more
han industry level factors. Bekaert et al. (2009) use a linear fac-
or model to analyze international stock return comovement, and
hey also find that country of origin explains comovement. Chan
t al. (2007) find that firms in the same industry exhibit return
omovement, where industry is measured according to several
opular classification schemes. Karolyi and Stulz (1996) use
igh frequency intraday trading data to measure comovement
etween U.S. and Japanese stocks. They find that comovement
s high during large market movements, and they conclude that
nternational diversification does not protect against broad mar-
et shocks.
Researchers have also attempted to separate comovement
rivers into fundamental and sentimental sources. Barberis et al.
2005) develop a model where firms within the same “style”
omove, even though their cash flows may be uncorrelated. They
nd that firms added to the S&P 500 experience a significant
ncrease in comovement with other S&P 500 firms. This result
uilds on Vijh’s (1994) results and is consistent with the senti-
ent based view of return comovement. Similarly, Greenwood
2008) looks at firms that are overweighted in the Nikkei 225
ndex and finds that overweight stocks comove significantly
ith other Nikkei 225 stocks. In addition, being overweight is
egatively associated with comovement with stocks outside the
ndex. Kumar and Lee (2006) also find support for the senti-
ent based comovement view by analyzing retail investor stock
rades.
Another approach to explaining comovement is by decom-
osing stock returns into different types of news. Viewing the
ntrinsic value of an asset as the present value of a stream of
uture cash flows, that asset’s value may fluctuate due to (i)
hanges in expected future cash flows, and (ii) changes in the dis-
ount rate applied to those cash flows. Campbell (1991) looks at
ggregate New York Stock Exchange returns and develops a vec-
or autoregression for decomposing index returns into cash flow
ews and discount rate news. Vuolteenaho (2002) elaborates on
ampbell’s work by decomposing individual stock returns. He
nds that cash flow news is more important for explaining firm-
evel stock returns than discount rate news. In addition, discount
ate news is driven mainly by marketwide forces.
.  Data
To investigate the relationship between Korean business
roup membership and stock return comovement, we begin
ith all publicly traded firms listed on the Korean Stock
xchange (KSE), taken from DataGuide Pro. The sample period
s 2002–2011. We delete firm observations that are missing stock
eturns or financial information. We also exclude financial firms
ecause they are subject to heavy government regulation and
re more likely to have different financial policies such as cap-
tal and ownership structures than other non-financial firms in
orea. After these screens, our initial sample includes 893 firms
isted in the KSE over the sample period.
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Table 1
Summary statistics. Panel A provides the total number of firms in a Korean business group in the sample as well as the distribution of the number of firms per business
group over the sample period. Panel B reports the distribution of the total number of industries in each business group. The sample includes domestic common stocks
listed on the KSE from 2002 to 2011 with coverage in DataGuide.
Panel A:
Year No. KSE-listed
firms
No. KSE-listed
firms belonging to
a business group
No. business groups Number of firms per business group
Mean Max Min
2002 685 118 25 4.7 17 2
2003 694 124 26 4.8 17 2
2004 693 140 30 4.7 16 2
2005 684 141 31 4.5 14 2
2006 684 144 32 4.5 14 2
2007 696 152 34 4.5 15 2
2008 710 160 34 4.7 15 2
2009 729 168 34 4.9 16 2
2010 742 184 34 5.4 18 2
2011 743 178 34 5.2 17 2
Panel B:
Year Number of Industries Number of Industries per business group
Mean Max Min
2002 18 3.2 15 1
2003 18 3.3 16 1
2004 18 3.2 15 1
2005 18 3.1 11 1
2006 18 3.2 13 1
2007 18 3.0 13 1
2008 18 3.1 11 1
2009 18 3.2 12 1
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From our initial sample, we identify firms belonging to
orean business groups using data published by the Korea
air Trade Commission (KFTC). To identify business group
ffiliations, we first obtain the information regarding the rank-
ng of Korean business groups and the list of affiliates from
he KFTC over the sample period. The list of group affiliates
nnounced by the KFTC includes both listed and unlisted affili-
tes, but we consider only listed affiliates. We exclude business
roups owned by the Korean government. We also require that a
usiness group have at least two affiliates in order to be included
n our sample.
KFTC reports group affiliation once a year, usually in April.
owever, in practice a chaebol may sell an affiliate or add a new
ember firm during the year. If there is a large discrepancy in
he date of group affiliation from KFTC’s announcement, we
se reports from daily newspapers to verify changes in group
ffiliation. We follow the KSE’s industry classification standard,
hich is roughly equivalent to the two digit Standard Industrial
lassification (SIC) scheme. Results are not materially affected
f we use the SIC classification standard. In total, we identify 40
orean business groups with 209 affiliates in our sample which
eet all of the above criteria.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for Korean business
roups and their member firms in our sample. Panel A shows
he total number of firms listed in the KSE and the distribution of
g
F
c
a3.5 12 1
3.3 9 1
he firms which belong to chaebols in the sample, as well as the
otal number of chaebols. The total number of firms listed in the
SE varies over time. Starting in 2002 there were 685 listed firms
n our sample, and at the end of the sample period in 2011 there
ere 743. Also, the total number of affiliates listed in the KSE
ncreased from 118 in 2002 to 178 in 2011, and the number of
orean business groups expanded from 25 groups to 34 groups.
owever, not all firms belonging to Korean business groups are
isted on the KSE. The average proportion of listed firms in a
haebol is only 20%. Chaebols have a mean group size of 4.5
rms. Panel B of Table 1 shows the characteristics of 18 industry
roups over the sample period. The mean number of industries
er chaebol is 3.3, with a maximum of 16 industries, suggesting
hat business groups in the sample tend to be diversified across
ndustries.
.  Business  group  and  stock  return  comovement
.1.  Evidence  of  stock  return  comovement
In this section, we examine the impact of Korean business
roup affiliation on the covariance structure of stock returns.
ollowing existing literature, we employ the capital asset pri-
ing model (CAPM) as our baseline model, and begin our
nalysis by evaluating the degree of the return comovement
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u
o
s
b
s
e
t
r
R
w
t
r
a
t
w
g
o
2
t
e
a
r
s
o
R
w
i
s
c
m
m
(
t
c
c
(
q
v
a
n
s
c
5
c
a
a
u
Table 2
Business group comovement. For each stock in the sample, we estimate a time-
series regression of stock returns on the returns of a business group index, the
market portfolio, and industry indices. Cross-sectional averages of the estimated
coefficients are reported, with t-statistics in parentheses. The group index (GR) is
the equally weighted return of all stocks from the firm’s corresponding business
group, excluding the firm itself. The market index (MKT) is the return index
of all stocks listed in the Korean stock market. The industry index (IND) is the
equally weighted return of the stock’s corresponding industry, according to the
KSE 18-industry classification. The sample period is 2002 to 2011.
Frequency βGROUP βMKT βIND
Daily 0.344 0.7056
(18.27) (29.40)
0.309 0.3579 0.382
(17.22) (11.13) (13.31)
Weekly 0.370 0.6937
(15.11) (21.42)
0.335 0.2931 0.433
(14.30) (6.91) (12.24)
Monthly 0.486 0.5795
(11.78) (10.44)
0.432 0.1030 0.546
(10.49) (1.58) (7.26)
Quarterly 0.515 0.4838
(9.58) (7.72)
0.473 0.0863 0.456
(7.30) (0.82) (4.34)
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sing the slope coefficients from a regression of stock returns
n the returns of other stocks in the same chaebol.1 We build a
et of equally weighted portfolio return indices for each chae-
ol. We use the returns of all affiliates listed in the KSE in the
ame business group when constructing the return indices. For
ach stock that belongs to a chaebol, we estimate a stock-level
ime-series regression at daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly
eturn frequencies:
i,t =  αi +  βGRRGRt +  βMKTRMKTt +  εi,t (1)
here, Ri,t denotes the excess return of a particular stock i at time
, and RGRt and RMKTt denote the excess return of the stock’s cor-
esponding business group, and the excess return of the market
t time t, respectively (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). We exclude
he return of the firm whose returns are the dependent variable
hen computing its return relative to the rest of the business
roup (RGRt ) to avoid introducing spurious correlations.
As discussed above, existing literature finds that the returns
f firms in the same industry exhibit comovement (Chan et al.,
007). Given that chaebols tend to be diversified across indus-
ries, it is unlikely that our results are driven by such industry
ffects. Nevertheless, we control for possible industry effects by
dding a return index for each industry by equally weighting the
eturn of the firm’s corresponding industry group in our regres-
ion model, and we estimate a regression which is an extension
f Eq. (1):
i,t =  αi +  βGRRGRt +  βMKTRMKTt +  βINDRINDt +  εi,t (2)
here RINDt is the excess return of the firm’s corresponding
ndustry. βGR is our measure of comovement, which is the sen-
itivity of the member firm returns to the return of the rest of the
haebol after controlling for other variables in the regression
odel. We run the above regressions using daily, weekly and
onthly return frequencies.
Table 2 reports the time series regression estimates of Eqs.
1) and (2) and the averages of the estimated coefficients, with
-statistics in parentheses. Results show that the stock returns of
haebol firms exhibit robustly positive comovement even after
ontrolling for both market and industry effects. Group betas
βGR) are highly significant across both models and all data fre-
uencies. Average group betas vary from 0.309 to 0.515 over the
arious specifications. Industry betas (βIND) are between 0.382
nd 0.546 across specifications. Group betas remain highly sig-
ificant after controlling for industry effects, suggesting that the
trong positive return comovement among firms in the same
haebol is not due to industry comovement.
.  Sources  of  group  return  comovementHaving demonstrated evidence of positive stock return
omovement among firms in the same chaebol, we continue our
nalysis by looking at comovement from the perspective of the
1 Kim et al. (2015) calculate pairwise correlations for business groups and
verage the correlations within each business group. We find it advantageous to
se a modified market model that controls for industry and market comovement.
i
a
c
fi
o
s
entrinsic value of an asset, where innovations in both expected
uture cash flows (fundamentals) and expected discount rates of
 firm determine changes in stock returns.
.1.  Comovement  of  earnings
In this section, we examine the sources of group return
omovement by investigating the association between firm fun-
amentals and business group comovement. If comovement of
haebol firm stock returns is driven by fundamentals, then the
ash flows of firms in the same chaebol could also be systemati-
ally correlated. Chaebol member firms are legally independent
rms whose shares are separately traded in the Korean stock
arket. However, in practice it is believed that member firms
erve as subdivisions of a controlling shareholder, resulting in
lose economic relationships among affiliates (Chang and Hong,
000). If strong group comovement of stock returns is driven by
roup-wide activities which decrease or increase innovations in
he fundamentals of affiliates, then it is possible that firm funda-
entals would also exhibit strong comovement within the same
usiness group.
Following Pirinsky and Wang (2006), we use quarterly earn-
ngs of group members as a proxy for firm fundamentals and
nvestigate whether the group effect on return comovement of
ffiliates is driven by the comovement of firms’ fundamental
ash flows. We construct three earnings measures. For each
rm in our sample, we first calculate the change in the level
f earnings over the past one, two and four quarters. We then
cale each earnings change variable by the firm’s book value of
quity, and denote these three earnings growth rates Earning1,
76 C.H. Cho, T. Mooney / Review of Deve
Table 3
Business group earnings comovement. For each stock in the sample, we estimate
time-series regressions of its earnings growth rate on group, industry and market
earnings growth indices. Earning1, Earning2, and Earning4 are the earnings
change from the previous 1, 2, and 4 quarters, respectively, scaled by the lagged
book value of equity. The group and industry earnings-growth indices include
all stocks from the firm’s corresponding business group and industry, excluding
the firm itself, and the market earnings growth index includes all stocks in the
Korean stock market. Average values of the estimated coefficients are reported
with t-statistics in parentheses. The sample includes domestic common stocks
traded on KSE from 2002 to 2011 with coverage in DataGuide.
Group
Earnings
Growth
Market
Earnings
Growth
Industry
Earnings
Growth
Earning1 0.2876 0.0989 0.1668
(3.56) (1.65) (2.10)
Earning2 0.4852 0.0182 0.0658
(5.77) (0.80) (1.00)
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Zt =  ΓZt−1 +  ηt (11)
2 See Vuolteenaho (2002) and Callen and Segal (2010) for more details ofarning4 0.5016 0.072 0.0747
(3.10) (1.31) (0.81)
arning2, and Earning4, respectively. Using these three firm-
evel earnings change variables, we create market, industry, and
roup earnings change indices by equally weighting the earn-
ngs changes of all firms within a chaebol, industry, and market,
enoted as EarningMKTk , EarningINDk , and EarningGRk , where
 = (1, 2, 4). We exclude each firm’s earnings growth ratio from
he group and industry index to which it belongs. We also delete
ll firms with fewer than 16 quarterly earnings during the sample
eriod. We then estimate a time-series regression for each stock:
i,t =  αi +  βGREarningGRk,t +  βMKTEarningMKTk,t
+  βINDEarningINDk,t +  εi,t (3)
Table 3 reports the cross-sectional means of market, indus-
ry, and group earnings betas. Results show a significant positive
ssociation between a firm’s earnings growth rate the earnings
rowth rate of the business group to which it belongs. Aver-
ge group betas (βGR) are between 0.2876 and 0.5016 across
arnings growth rates, with t-statistics all greater than 3. Inter-
stingly, the magnitudes of the market and industry factors are
ower, and significance of those betas is not as robust. Overall,
esults are consistent with the argument that strong comovement
f returns is driven by correlation of chaebol firm fundamentals.
hese results contrast with those of Kim et al. (2015), who do
ot find evidence of a relation between group comovement and
rm fundamentals, as measured by ROA, cash flow, and related
arty transactions.
.2.  Decomposition  of  returns
We have presented evidence that the stock returns of chaebol
rms exhibit positive comovement, and that this comovement is
onsistent with comovement in the fundamentals of group mem-
ers. We further explore sources of return comovement through
ariance decomposition, separating firm stock returns into cash
t
v
vlopment Finance 5 (2015) 71–81
ow news and discount rate news components. We then eval-
ate the relative importance of the two return components in
xplaining group comovement.
.2.1.  Return  decomposition2
Based on Campbell’s (1991) linear approximation that
ecomposes firm stock returns into cash flow news and discount
ate news, Vuolteenaho (2002) implements a log-linear valua-
ion model based on accounting data by replacing dividends with
he clean surplus identity:
mt−1 =  (rt) −  (roet) +  bmt (4)
mt−1 =
∞∑
j=0
rj(rt+j) −
∞∑
j=0
rj(roet+j) (5)
here bmt, rt, and roet denote the log book to market ratio,
og stock returns, and log return on equity at time t, and ρj
enotes the discount coefficient term.3 Eq. (4) separates price
nto expected future cash flow and discount rate news. In order
o analyze return, Vuolteenhao further derives the model by tak-
ng the change in expectation of Eq. (4) from t  −  1 to t  and
earranging:
t −  Et−1(rt) =  Et
∞∑
j=0
ρj(roet+j −  ft+j) −  Et
∞∑
j=1
ρjrt+j
(6)
t −  Et−1(rt) =  Ncft+1 −  Ndrt+1 (7)
here Et denotes the change in expectation from period t  −  1
o t.
The return decomposition in Eq. (7) can be conve-
iently operationalized via vector autoregression. Following
uolteenaho (2002), we implement the return decomposition
y employing stock returns, earnings divided by beginning book
alue of equity (ROE), and book-to-market ratio as state vari-
bles in the VAR model assuming following form:
t =  α1rt−1 +  α2roet−1 +  α3bmt−1 +  η1t (8)
oet =  β1rt−1 +  β2roet−1 +  β3bmt−1 +  η2t (9)
mt =  γ1rt−1 +  γ2roet−1 +  γ3bmt−1 +  η3t (10)
Notation for the equations above is more convenient in matrix
orm, and an individual firm’s state vector is assumed as follows:his method. Callen and Segal (2010) provide a well-documented summary of
ariance decomposition method. They also provide SAS programs for estimating
ariance decompositions from cross-sectional time-series data in their appendix.
3 Following existing literature, our study assumes that ρ = 1 for simplicity.
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here
t =
⎛
⎜⎝
rt
roet
bmt
⎞
⎟⎠ , Γ  =
⎛
⎜⎝
α1 α2 α3
β1 β2 β3
γ1 γ2 γ3
⎞
⎟⎠ , ηt =
⎛
⎜⎝
η1t
η2t
η3t
⎞
⎟⎠
Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we compute cash flow news
nd discount rate news:
cft =  (e1 +  λ1)′ηt
rt =  λ′tηt
here ek′ = (1,0,.  . .,0) is a vector whose first element is one and
hose other elements are zero, and λk′ = ek′ρΓ  (I  −  ρΓ  )−1 with
I −  ρΓ  )−1 being the matrix equivalent of the present value of
he sum. We can estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the
ash flow news and the discount rate news as follows:
ar(Ncft) =  (e1 +  λ)′
∑
(e1 +  λ)
Nrt) =  λ′
∑
λ
ov(Ncft,  Nrt) =  λ′
∑
(e1 +  λ)
We decompose quarterly stock returns into cash flow and
iscount rate news by estimating the first order VAR model
n Eq. (7). Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we estimate the
AR from panel data using a weighted least squares (WLS)
pproach and one pooled prediction regression per state vari-
ble. We weigh each cross-section equally by deflating the data
or each firm-quarter by the number of firms in the correspond-
ng cross-section. We calculate a set of equally weighted indices
or group-, market-, and industry-level cash flow and discount
ate news comovement for each quarter. Similar to Eq. (2), we
hen measure the degree of comovement of cash flow and dis-
ount rate news for each firm by estimating the following firm
evel time-series regressions:
Fi,t =  αi +  βGRCFGRt +  βMKTCFMKTt
+  βINDCFINDt +  εi,t (12)
Ri,t =  αi +  βGRDRGRt +  βMKTDRMKTt
+  βINDDRINDt +  εi,t (13)
.2.2.  The  relative  importance  of  cash  ﬂow  and  discount
ate news
We evaluate the relative importance of cash flow news and
iscount rate news on group comovement by comparing the
agnitude of the coefficients in the cross-sectional regression
odels that include either cash flow news or discount rate newsomovement variables. Given that cash flow news is computed
y the sum of innovations in current and future earnings, we fur-
her break down cash flow news into current period and future
eriod cash flow news. We examine the relative contribution of Ta
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hese proxies for real activity and financial activity to provide
ore detailed evidence on the source of cash flow news for group
omovement (Callen and Segal, 2010). We consider the follow-
ng cross-sectional regression model with various firm and group
haracteristics as control variables and compare the magnitude
f the coefficients:
CIi =  αi +  βCFCFi +  βDRDRi +  βFirmFirmi
+  βGroupGroupi +  εi (14)
here GCIi is the business group stock return comovement beta
rom Eq. (2), CFi is the is the cash flow news comovement beta
rom Eq. (12), DRi is the discount rate news comovement beta
rom Eq. (13), Firmi are firm-level control variables, Groupi are
roup-level control variables, and εi is an error term. We consider
 set of firm and group characteristics that have been documented
o be associated with return comovement. Earnings  correlation
s the index of earnings comovement as measured using Eq. (3).
ize is the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization mea-
ured at the end of the previous quarter. Book-to-market  ratio
s the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity
alculated at the end of the previous quarter. Leverage  is the
atio of total debt to total assets. ROA  is return on assets. Group
ssets is the total business group assets reported by KFTC. No.
irms is the natural log of the total number of affiliates in the
usiness group. HHI  is the degree of industry diversification of
he business group, measured by the Herfindahl index. Institu-
ional  Ownership  is the equity ownership held by mutual fund
anagers in Korea.
We average all independent variables over the sample period,
hen standardize them by subtracting the sample mean and
ividing by the standard deviation to give the variables a zero
ean and unit variance (Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Chava and
urnanandam, 2010). This approach allows direct comparison
f the regression coefficients since they represent a one standard
eviation change in each variable. We estimate eight different
ross-sectional model specifications to capture the combined
xplanatory power of these fundamentals for group comove-
ent. This methodology allows us to compare a set of factors
hat best explain variations in group comovement.
Table 4 presents correlations between the dependent variables
cash flow news, current cash flow news, future cash flow news,
nd discount rate news) and other firm and group control vari-
bles. We observe several key relations. First, although group
tock return comovement is positively associated with both cash
ow and discount rate news comovement variables in univariate
nalysis, cash flow news comovement is more strongly asso-
iated with group comovement than with discount rate news
omovement. Second, future cash flow news comovement is
ore strongly related to group comovement than current cash
ow news comovement. Lastly, the correlation among firm and
roup specific variables is relatively low, with the highest corre-
ation of −0.482 between ROA and Leverage, giving us a level
f confidence in using independent firm and group variables in
ur models.
Table 5 reports results of the cross-sectional regressions of
usiness group stock return comovement on cash flow news
f
s
o
tlopment Finance 5 (2015) 71–81
omovement and discount rate news comovement. The first two
olumns estimate the relative contribution of cash flow news
nd discount rate news on group comovement, while the other
olumns (columns (3)–(8)) further decompose cash flow news
nto current period and future period cash flow news. We find
ubstantial evidence that chaebol stock return comovement is
ore strongly associated with cash flow news than discount
ate news, after controlling for both firm and group characteris-
ics. The coefficients on cash flow news in columns (1) and (2)
re positive and statistically significant, and they are about five
imes greater in absolute value than the coefficient on discount
ate news. Because all independent variables are standardized,
he coefficients represent the effect of a one standard deviation
hange, and the difference in magnitudes suggests that cash flow
ews is more important in driving stock return comovement than
iscount rate news.
We also find that the coefficient of current cash flow news
n columns (3) and (4) shows little explanatory power for the
ependent variable. Neither of the coefficients on current cash
ow news in column (3) and (4) are statistically significant.
nterestingly, when future cash flow news is added to the model
s shown in column (7) and (8), the coefficient of future cash
ow news shows considerable explanatory power, suggesting
hat the explanatory power of real activity for group comove-
ent is mainly driven by future real activity. Finally, all models
xcept those in columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient
n discount rate news is not significant, further evidence that
eal activity explains stock returns comovement more so than
nancial activity.
Overall, VAR analysis suggests that cash flow news comove-
ent plays a more important role in explaining Korean business
roup stock return comovement than discount rate news. In
ther words, real activity that drives cash flows to equityholders
ppears more strongly associated with return comovement than
nancial activity, represented by the firm’s cost of equity. Nev-
rtheless, the evidence does not rule out the possibility that such
 phenomenon can also be jointly driven by both unobserved
tunneling” and “propping” behavior of a business group. Our
nding that return comovement is positively related to earnings
omovement is consistent with the findings of Kim and Yi (2006)
hat earnings management is more prevalent among chaebols. It
s plausible that the comovement of affiliated stock returns in
orean business groups could be driven by tunneling behav-
or of the controlling shareholders of chaebols. Djankov et al.
2008) show that business groups provide direct opportunities to
xpropriate wealth through tunneling using related party trans-
ctions. If such tunneling behavior decreases innovations in the
ash flows of chaebol members and increases comovement in
ash flow news, then the observed comovement of chaebol firm
tock returns may also reflect propping behavior.
Byun et al. (2013) demonstrate that chaebol firms have a
onsiderably lower cost of debt in the Korean capital market and
rgue that this is because investors perceive enhanced protection
rom firms belonging to chaebols, as membership is a credible
ignal that a troubled firm will receive financial assistance from
ther member firms. If this group-wide propping activity reduces
he default risk of member firms in the business group, it is likely
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Table 5
Business group comovement and stock return decomposition. The dependent variable is the degree of stock return comovement with a firm’s business group. Cash
Flow News and Discount Rate News are based on the return decomposition of Vuolteenaho (2002). We standardize all independent variables over the sample period.
Coefficient estimates are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. The sample includes domestic common stocks traded on KSE from 2002 to 2011 with coverage in
DataGuide.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash Flow News 0.7368 0.6978
(9.39) (9.06)
Current Cash Flow News 0.0614 0.0739 0.0554 0.067
(0.78) (0.98) (0.82) (1.02)
Future Cash Flow News 0.647 0.5955 0.6461 0.594
(6.98) (6.42) (6.96) (6.41)
Discount Rate News 0.1443 0.121 0.2124 0.1798 0.1038 0.0882 0.0972 0.0799
(2.91) (2.55) (3.40) (2.97) (1.87) (1.62) (1.73) (1.45)
Size 0.0241 0.0098 0.0971 0.0783 0.0481 0.0309 0.0479 0.0299
(0.87) (0.34) (2.85) (2.17) (1.60) (0.95) (1.59) (0.92)
Leverage 0.1263 0.09 −0.0168 −0.1204 0.1056 0.0359 0.0862 0.0071
(0.54) (0.38) (−0.06) (−0.40) (0.41) (0.14) (0.33) (0.03)
Book to Market 0.0678 0.0957 0.1105 0.1315 0.0646 0.0903 0.0692 0.0956
(1.47) (1.99) (1.85) (2.14) (1.26) (1.68) (1.34) (1.77)
ROA 5.8642 5.6724 0.4559 −0.1881 1.6919 1.6023 1.987 1.9285
(1.50) (1.46) (0.09) (−0.04) (0.40) (0.38) (0.46) (0.45)
Earning Comovement 0.0794 0.0712 0.0556 0.0453 0.0189 0.0158 0.0068 0.0012
(2.29) (2.11) (1.16) (0.98) (0.49) (0.41) (0.16) (0.03)
Group Asset 0.099 0.1297 0.1192 0.1247
(1.88) (1.93) (2.03) (2.12)
No. Firms −0.0028 −0.0062 −0.0045 −0.0049
(−0.80) (−1.39) (−1.16) (−1.27)
Herfindahl Index −0.0852 −0.1057 −0.0842 −0.0811
(−1.10) (−1.07) (−0.97) (−0.94)
Institutional Ownership 3.7059 5.2461 2.972 2.904
(2.16) (2.41) (1.53) (1.50)
Intercept −0.7565 −1.2485 −2.4402 −2.9837 −1.2623 −1.7673 −1.2692 −1.7923
(−0.96) (−1.56) (−2.48) (−3.00) (−1.47) (−1.99) (−1.47) (−2.02)
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tdjusted R 47.63% 51.12% 13.28% 
umber of Obs. 149 149 149 
hat the discount rates of member firms would eventually comove
ithin the same business group resulting in the comovement of
iscount rate news. However, distinguishing these explanations
or the group comovement phenomenon is beyond the current
cope of the study.
.  Change  in  group  membership
We further examine return comovement using a subset of
rms that either joined or left a chaebol during the sample period.
f affiliation with a chaebol drives the covariance structure of a
rm’s stock returns, then analysis of the subsample of firms that
hange group membership could provide a more rigorous setting
or testing of the group comovement effect.
We identify firms that join or leave chaebols by comparing
he KFTC list of Korean business groups in two consecutive
ears. We then manually verify the date the firm joins or leaves
he group using major newspapers and the database compiled by
he Korean Listed Companies’ Association (KLCA). Our final
ubsample of firms that change group membership consists of
0 addition and 17 removal events over the sample period. To
ssess the effect of changes in chaebol membership on return
omovement, for each addition and removal we estimate the
t
c
f
60.60% 36.21% 39.39% 36.06% 39.40%
49 149 149 149 149
ollowing regression separately for the 3 years before and 3 years
fter the event:
i,t =  αi + βGRRGRt +  βDUMDGR +  βDGRDGRRGRt
+  βMKTRMKTt +  βINDRINDt +  εi,t (15)
i,t is the excess return of a stock i, RGRt is the excess return
f the stock’s business group, RMKTt is the return on the mar-
et portfolio, and RINDt is the equally weighted index of the
tock’s industry. DGR is a dummy variable identifying the firm’s
ddition to or removal from the business group. To clarify the
nterpretation of the dummy variable, we define it in two differ-
nt ways, according to whether a firm was added to or removed
rom a chaebol. The dummy variable for addition to a chaebol
akes a value of 0 if the firm stays out of the business group, and
 when it is added to the group. If a firm is removed from a chae-
ol, we assign the value of 0 when the firm stays in the group,
nd 1 when the firm leaves the group. We are most interested in
he interaction between addition/deletion and comovement, and
he effect of this change in business group affiliation on return
omovement is measured by βDGR. We run the above regression
or daily, weekly and monthly return frequencies. We exclude the
 month period ending the month before and after the addition
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Table 6
Changes in stock return comovement for firms that join or leave business groups.
We identify a sample of 57 firms that either join or leave business groups between
2002 and 2011. For each stock in the sample we estimate a time-series regres-
sion for the 3 years prior to and the 3 years subsequent to the event (inclusion
or deletion from business group). Panel A reports results for firms that join a
business group; in this panel, DUM takes a value of 1 if a firm joins a busi-
ness group. Panel B reports results for firms that leave a business group; in this
panel, DUM takes a value of 1 if a firm leaves a group. DGR is the interaction
between group comovement and the indicator for joining/leaving a group. The
group index (GR) is constructed as the equally weighted return of all stocks from
the firm’s corresponding business group, excluding the firm itself. The market
index (MKT) is the return index of all stocks listed on the KSE. The industry
index (IND) is the equally weighted return of the stock’s corresponding indus-
try, according to the KSE 18-industry classification. Cross-sectional averages of
coefficient estimates are presented, with t-statistics in parentheses.
Sample βGROUP βDUM βDGR βMKT βIND
Panel A: Additions
Daily 0.036 0.400 0.111 0.359 0.618
t-stat (1.43) (3.04) (4.19) (4.14) (8.19)
Weekly 0.037 0.091 0.132 0.726 0.298
t-stat (0.70) (0.30) (2.34) (6.66) (3.47)
Monthly 0.078 −1.638 0.181 0.186 0.749
t-stat (0.78) (2.11) (2.01) (4.92) (1.32)
Panel B: Deletions
Daily 0.177 −0.110 −0.051 0.267 0.588
t-stat (3.50) (0.37) (0.82) (2.97) (6.20)
Weekly 0.126 0.467 0.017 0.899 0.017
t-stat (1.60) (1.46) (0.20) (0.16) (7.20)
Monthly 0.214 3.792 0.084 0.018 0.770
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C-stat (1.06) (2.52) (0.43) (0.06) (3.08)
r removal announcement to reflect the time for incorporation
nd diffusion of information to investors.
Table 6 presents the results of regressions with the chaebol
ddition and removal dummy. Panel A shows the average of the
stimated betas with respect to the various indices when affiliates
re added  to a business group, and panel B shows the average
f the estimated betas when they are removed  from a business
roup. Although removal from a business group is not signif-
cantly associated with changes in comovement, results show
hat firms newly added to a chaebol experience a significant
ncrease in sensitivity to that chaebol’s stock returns (βDGR).
his result holds for daily, weekly and monthly return frequen-
ies. The increase in βDGR is between 0.111 and 0.181 across
eturn frequencies. This result supports the evidence presented
arlier using the full sample, implying that a firm’s addition to
 business group has a significant and positive effect on that
rm’s comovement with other firms in the same business group,
onsistent with Kim et al. (2015).
.  Conclusion
Despite the increased academic interest in the role of business
roups in a country’s economy, the impact of business group
ffiliations on the stock prices of member firms is relatively
nexplored. This study investigates whether the Korean business
roup affiliations affect the covariance structure of underlying
tock returns. We find positive and significant comovement in
Clopment Finance 5 (2015) 71–81
he stock returns of firms belonging to the same Korean business
roup. We also demonstrate that our findings are robust to a
ubsample of affiliate firms that changed their group affiliation.
We also examine the comovement of chaebol member firm
undamentals. Consistent with the fundamental-based explana-
ions, our results indicate that the comovement of stock returns
an be explained by comovement in corporate earnings. These
ndings suggest that investors other consider firms belonging
o the same business group as relevant since the unique gover-
ance and structural system of Korean business groups allows
oordination of firm activities within the group.
Finally, given that strong comovement in the stock returns
f group affiliates is attributed to correlation of fundamen-
als, we further explore more detailed sources of the group
eturns comovement by examining the relative importance of
ash flow and discount rate news. We find that cash flow news
lays a greater role in explaining stock return comovement
han discount rate news. Our evidence that Korean business
roup return comovement is driven by the relative importance
f two fundamental return factors contrasts sharply with the
esults of Kim et al. (2015) and may have important implications
bout the widely documented tunneling and propping behaviors
f business groups. That is, our results might imply that the
omovement of cash flow and discount rate news are closely
elated to unobserved tunneling and propping behaviors of busi-
ess groups, respectively. However, although our study suggests
 possible linkage between two return decomposing compo-
ents and tunneling and propping behaviors, whether tunneling
r propping effects contribute significantly to the phenomenon
f group comovement is an interesting issue that warrants future
esearch.
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